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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
What is the appropriate standard of review when parties
submit a case for ruling to the District Court on
stipulated facts?
Is the Hospital's Notice of Claim filed in Nevada prior
to the appointment of a personal representative valid
for any purpose?
Is the Hospital's Notice of Claim filed in Nevada prior
to the publication of Notice to Creditors valid for
any purpose?
Was there an "Adjudication11 in the State of Nevada
allowing the Hospital's claim which can serve as a
contemplated basis for the operation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 75-4-401?
Is there sufficient evidence of fraud which would
justify the operation of Utah Code Annotated 75-1-106?
Should this Court judicially create an equitable
exception to the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code in the instant case?
Does Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-38 operate to
the exclusion of Section 75-3-803 in cases where a
cause of action exists in this state, but the decedent
dies out of Utah?
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1

STATUTES AND RULES
§75-1-105

CONSTRUCTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEAL.

This code is a general act intended as a unified coverage
of its subject matter, and no part of it shall be deemed
impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if it can
reasonably be avoided.
§75-1-106.

EFFECT OF FRAUD AND EVASION.

Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with
any proceeding or in any statement filed under this
code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the
provisions or purposes of this code, any person injured
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from any person (other
than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud,
whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be commenced
within three years after the discovery of the fraud, but
no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later than five years after the
time of commission of the fraud. This section has no
bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a
decedent during his lifetime which affects the succession
of his estate.
§75-3-104.

CLAIMS AGAINST DECEDENT - NECESSITY OF
ADMINISTRATION.

No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced
before the appointment of a personal representative.
After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed by this
chapter 3. After distribution a creditor whose claim
has not been barred may recover from the distributees as
provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a former personal
representative individually liable as provided in Section
75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding
by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right
to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which
might be sought therein.
§75-3-803.

LIMITATIONS OF PRESENTATIONS OF CLAIMS.

(1) All claims against a decedent1s estate which arose
before the death of the decedent, including claims of
the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may 7
contain errors.

liquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the
decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the date of the first
publication of notice to creditors if notice is given
in compliance with Section 75-3-801; provided claims
barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's
domicile before the first publication for claims in
the state are also barred in this state.
(b) Within three years after the decedent's death,
if notice to creditors has not been published.
(2) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise
at or after the death of the decedent, including claims
of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or
to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal
basis, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent
unless presented as follows:
(a) A claim based on a contract with the personal
representative, within three months after performance
by the personal representative is due;
(b) Any other claim, within three months after it
arises.
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge,
or other lien upon property of the estate; or
(b) To the limits of the insurance protection only,
any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent
or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance.
75-4-401.
An
of
is
he

EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION FOR OR AGAINST
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE.

adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor
or against any personal representative of the estate
binding on the local personal representative as if
were a party to the adjudication.

78-12-38.

OUTSIDE THIS STATE.

If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies
without the state, the time which elapses between his
death and the expiration of one year after the issuing,
within the state, of letters testamentary or letters of
administration is not a part of the time limited for the
commencement of an action therefor against his executor
or administrator.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Fifth Judicial District
Court's denial of Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Claim
in a Probate proceeding/ Appellant's Petition for Allowance
of Claim was filed after Vickie Carroll, the personal representative of the Estate hereinafter Personal Representative,
denied the claim.

The District Court ruled that the claim

was barred by the operation of the nonclaim provisions of
§ 75-3-803 of the Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the hearing on the Appellant's Petition for
Allowance of Claim on September 10, 1984, the parties agreed
and stipulated to submit Appellant's Petition to the District
Court for ruling soley on the stipulated and undisputed facts
which are found in the Findings of Fact. (R 108; 110-112.)
The decedent died at the Hospital in Las Vegas
Nevada on December 21, 1982. Upon the decedent's admission
to the Hospital on December 6, 1982, he listed his address
as 4001 East Sahara Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada, which is the
address of Maycliff Mini Storage and RV Park, the location
of property stored by the decedent. (R 110.) On January 4,
1983, Mr. Jared Shafer was appointed Special Administrator
of the decedent's estate in Nevada by order of the Eighth

4
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Judicial District Court, Clark County Nevada.

Appellant

filed a creditor's claim in the amount of $24,832.54 with
the Nevada Court on January 6, 1983, which was prior to the
appointment of any personal representative or general administrator in the Nevada administration. (R 111.) Before the
filing of the Creditor's Claim, on January 5, 1983, Vickie
Larson Carroll, the decedent's daughter, nominated Mr.
Shafer to be the general administrator of her father's
estate in Nevada.

No general administrator was appointed,

however, until February 18, 1983.

(R 67-68.)

In the

meantime another administration of the estate was open in
the State of Montana. (R 111.)
The Utah probate was timely commenced on January 26,
1983, when Vickie Larsen Carroll petitioned and was appointed
personal representative of the estate. (R 111.) Publication
of Notice to Creditors in Utah occured in January and February
of 1983.

(R 111.)
Appellant filed its Creditor's Claim in Utah on

November 14, 1983.

(R 111.) The Personal Representative

denied the claim and Appellant filed its Petition for
Allowance of Claim on June 8, 1984. (R 111.) The District
Court dismissed Appellant's petition on the motion of the
Personal Representative after a hearing in which all counsel
submitted the matter based solely upon a series of stipulated
and undisputed facts.

(R 110-112.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Hospital's Petition for Allowance of Claim

was submitted to the District Court for ruling on the basis
of stipulated facts. As such it is an agreed case, and the
denial of the petition by the trial court is not properly
designated as a "dismissal" implying a truncated evidentiary
process which would now require reviewing the facts in a
light most favorable to Appellant.

Since the stipulation of

the parties substitutes for trial, this Court should defer
the factual findings of the trial court and confine its view
of the evidence to those findings.

Indeed, Appellant tactically

agreed that the matter be submitted on this basis.
2.

Utah Code Annotated 75-3-104 prohibits filing

claims against the decedent before the appointment of a
personal representative.

This Court should support the

expressed policies and intentions of the framers of the
Uniform Probate Code and encourage orderly and uniform
estate administration by requiring, consistent with §75-3-104,
that creditors submit their claims to properly appointed
personal representatives. This Court should hold, with other
authorities, that a claim filed prior to the appointment of
a personal representative is void.
3.

For similar policy reasons as those expressed

the above paragraph 2, this Court should hold that creditor's
claims filed prior to publication of Notice to Cretitors are
void.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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4-. The Trial Court found no evidence of fraud which
would trigger the operation of § 75-1-106 Utah Code Annotated.
Appellant was aware of the status of decedent's residence in
Nevada shortly before his death even though it may not have
been aware of the actual address of his residence in the State
of Utah prior to his death. Decedent made no representations
regarding the state of his domicile or other states in which
he may of had assets.

Further, there is no evidence of con-

cealment of assets or of the other administrations of the
estate by the Personal Representative.

The Hospital with due

diligence could have discoverd the other administrations and
properly filed its claim.
5.

The special administrator of the Nevada adminis-

tration in his accounting and the Order Approving the Accounting
both recite as a finding of fact that the Hospital's claim
had been filed against the estate, but had not been paid.
This finding of fact is not an "adjudication" of the creditor's
claim as contemplated in Utah Code Annotated 75-4-401.
Therefore, there is no adjudication of the creditor's claim
in Nevada which would be binding on the Utah Personal Representative •
6.

There are no particular facts or other hardships

in this case which would warrant the creation of an exception
to the nonclaim statute. The judicial creation of exceptions
to statutory schemes should be reserved for extraordinary
cases where the need for relief from severe hardship is
compelling. This is not an appropriate case for the creation
of a judicial exception.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.

The statutory scheme of the Uniform Probate

Code contemplates the continued operation of various statutes
of limitations including Utah Code Annotated 78-12-38.
However, the Uniform Probate Code provides that the first
limitation provision to accomplish a bar on the particular
facts of each case will control.

In this case §75-3-803(a)

accomplished a bar prior to §78-12-38 and therefore controls.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE FINDINGS
OF FACT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT
SPECIAL INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
On June 14, 1984 approximately one and one-half
years after the first publication of Notice to Creditors,
Appellant filed its "Petition for Allowance of Claim and Order
Allowing Claim". (R 17).

The Personal Representative of the

Estate responded by filing her "Objection to Order Allowing
Claims" (R 23) and moved to dismiss the Petition.

(R 29-32).

The Parties each submitted memoranda which included statements
of fact and argument.

(R 30-32; 35-42; 98-107).

On September 10, 1984 the District Court called up
the Petition for Allowance of Claim and the motion to deny
the same.

Each party was represented by counsel and each

was heard.

The parties stipulated that there were no issues

of fact and further stipulated that the court should rule on
the basis the stipulated facts which are found in the Trial
Court's findings of fact (R 110-112) to which there has been
no objection.

(R 108).

The Court thereafter ruled denying

the Petition for Allowance of Claim.

(UCA 75-3-806 [2] ).

On appeal, Appellant now argues that this Court
"must view the facts in the light most favorable to the
Appellant".

(Appellant's Brief [hereinafter AB] at 7.)

The

Personal Representative believes that based on the parties'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stipulation below this is an inappropriate standard of review.
Indeed, Respondent urges that the District Court's rulings
based on facts commonly stipulated by both parties are entitled
to the same deference as if they had been entered after trial.
There can be no question that where a trial court
has dismissed a cause of action by entering a verdict or
judgment of nonsuit or no cause of action, or where a case
has been dismissed at the close of the Plaintiff's evidence
or on a motion for directed verdict, this Court will review
the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff's
contentions. Anderson v., Parson Red E-Mix Paving Company,
467 P.2d 45, 24 Utah 2d 128 (1970); Reliable Furniture Company
v. American Home Insurance Company, 466 P.2d 368, 24 Utah 2d
93 (1970); Newton v. State Road Commission, 462 P.2d 565, 23
Utah 2d 350 (1970); Wilkinson v. Stevens, 403 P.2d 31, 16
Utah 2d 424 (1965).

Appellant's Petition for Allowance of

Claim in the instant case, however, was not denied under any
of those circumstances which would warrant an appellate review
of the evidence in a light most favorable to Appellant.

Simply

stated, the policy that evidence should be viewed in a light
most favorable to Appellant is applicable only in cases where
the facts are disputed and the trier of fact has not had full
opportunity to hear and weigh all of the facts and evidence.
Such a rule is applied only where the evidentiary or fact
finding process has been abbreviated.

In the instant case the

parties stipulated to the facts. No additional evidence or
testimony was contemplated or tactically proffered* (See AB at 7)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Indeed, the parties1 stipulation regarding the facts substituted
for the evidentiary portion of the hearing, and authorized
the trial court to rule and draw legitimate inferences therefrom without being required to view the evidence in a light
favorable to either party.

(See Generally 73 Am Jur 2d

"Stipulations11 § 18). The Trial Court subsequently denied
Appellant's Petition.

The fact that the trial court's order

is labeled as a "dismissal", however, cannot substantively
transform the Court's action into something akin to a Rule
41 dismissal.
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties the
trial court entered findings of fact.

(R 110-112).

Appellant

does not challenge these findings. The Personal Representative
believes that since the Petition for Allowance of Claim was
submitted to the Court on the stipulation of the parties, said
stipulation amounts to the equivalent of a trial thereon, and
this Court should defer to the District Court's position with
regard to the facts, and no inference or preference should be
granted to the Appellant's contentions.

Provo City Corporation

v. Nielson Scott Company Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979); Polk
v. Koerner, 111 Ariz. 493, 533 P.2d 660 (1975).
Appellant's brief now contains various new allegations of fact not found in the Trial Court's findings.
These allegations relate primarily to the decedent's residence
or domicile, allegations of fraud, false statements, concealment,
the Appellant's lack of knowledge of the Utah proceedings and
its alleged reliance on various of the decedent's representations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(AB at 5, 15, 18, 19.) Respondent respectfully submits that • *
as these allegations are not found in the Trial Court's
Findings and did not form part of the stipulated case as
submitted to the trial court by Appellant, that they should
not be considered now by this Court.

Indeed this Court should

judicially limit its review to those facts contained in the
Trial Court's Findings as submitted to that court by earlier
stipulation,,

(R 110-112.) Because Appellant's brief contains

various allegations beyond the Trial Court's Findings of Fact,
however, Respondent's brief will reply to the Appellant's
allegations by reference to additional citations in the record
also not found in the findings.
POINT II
THE HOSPITAL'S CLAIM FILED IN NEVADA
PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE IS INVALID PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 75-3-104.
Vickie Carroll filed her nomination of Mr. Jared
Shafer to act as "Special Administrator" with limited authority
to collect and maintain the assets of the estate.

(R 48-55.)

This special administrator, similar to the law in Utah, was
given no power to act on creditor's claims or to initiate
publication to notice of creditors but rather was limited to the
specific powers granted him by order of the Nevada Court. (See,
e.g. , UCA 75-3-617.)

The claim of Southern Nevada Memorial

Hospital was filed in Nevada on January 6, 1983. (R 111.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The petition to appoint an administrator in Nevada
was filed January 10, 1983. (R 46.) Prior to entry of an
order appointing a general administrator in Nevada, an administration of the estate was opened in the state of Montana on
January 18, 1983.

(R 111; cf. R 67-68.) Mrs. Vonda Jean

Biesen appeared in both forums challenging the appointment of
administrators and claiming to be a surviving spouse. Vickie
Carroll was never appointed personal representative in the
State of Nevada.

She was appointed personal representative

in the administration of the estate in the State of Utah,
however, on the 26th day of January, 1983. (R 111.) No
general administrator with power to act on creditors claims
was appointed in the State of Nevada until February 18, 1983,
some 12 days after first publication of notice to creditors
by the Utah Personal Representative.

(R 67.)

In short no

personal representative or other person authorized to act
on creditors claims had been appointed in any state at the
time that Appellant filed it claim in the State of Nevada.
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-104 states:
"No proceeding to enforce a claim against the
estate of a decedent or his successors may be
revived or commenced before the appointment of
a personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings
and actions to enforce a claim against the
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed
by this Chapter 3. After distribution a
Creditor whose claim has not been barred may
recover from the distributees as provided in
Section 25-3-1004 or from a former personal
representative individually liable as provided
in section 75-3-1005. This Section has no
application to a proceeding by a secured
creditor of the decedent to enforce his right
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to his security except as to any deficiency
judgment which might be sought therein."
(Emphasis added).
The Editorial Board Comment to § 75-3-104 states
as follows:
"This and sections of part 8 of chapter
3, are designed to force creditors of
decedents to assert their claims against
duly appointed personal representatives.
Creditors of the decedent are interested
persons who may seek the appointment of
a personal representative (Section 75-3-301).
If no appointment is granted to another within 45 days after the decedent's death,the
Creditor may be eligible to be appointed
if other persons with priority decline to
serve or are ineligible (Secton 75-3-203).
But, if a personal representative has been
appointed and has closed the estate under
circumstances which leave a creditor's claim
unbarred, the creditor is premitted to enforce
his claims against distributees as well as
against the personal representative if any
duty owed to creditors under Section 75-3-807
or 75-3-1003 has been breached. The methods
for closing estates are outlined in Section
75-3-1001 - 75-3-1003. Termination of appointment are Sections 75-3-608 et. seg. may occur
though the estate is not closed and so may
be irrelevent to the question to whether
creditors may pursue distributees."
It is clear that the intent and policy of the framers
of the Utah Probate Code is to compel creditors to assert
claims against duly appointed personal representatives.

In

order to protect creditors from undue delay in the appointment
of a personal representative, creditors are given the option,
forty-five days after the death of the decedent to seek appointment themselves if others have declined to serve.

§ 75-3-201

U.C.A. In the instant case Appellant did not seek to enforce
its claim against the duly appointed representative but rather
it sought to enforce its claim against the special administrator
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who had no power to deal with the claim.

The Editorial Board

Comments to § 75-3-104 state that Chapter 3 of the code,
including part 8 on creditors claims, is applicable only after
the appointment of a personal representative.

Thus a creditor

may not properly present a claim pursuant to Section 75-3-804
until the personal representative has been appointed.
In Price v. Sommermeyer, 577 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1978),
the Colorado Supreme Court similarly held that pursuant to
§15-12-104 of the Colorado Revised Statutes a claim was not
valid unless a personal representative had been previously
appointed.

The Colorado Code Section interpreted in Price

is identical to Utah Code Annotated §75-3-104.
Since in the instant case no personal representative
had been appointed when Appellant filed its claim, the claim
cannot be said to have been properly presented pursuant to the
provisions of Chapter 3 of the Utah Probate Code.

As such it

is not binding upon the personal representative of the estate.

POINT III
THE CLAIM OF SOUTHERN NEVADA HOSPITAL IS INVALID
HAVING BEEN PREMATURELY FILED PRIOR TO PUBLICATION
OF NOTICE TO CREDITORS.
No notice to creditors was published in the administration of the Estate in Nevada as contemplated by UCA
§75-3-803. (R 111.) Notice to Creditors was first published
in Utah on January 30, and February 6, 1983. (R 9, 111.)
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An Editorial Board Comment to UCA 75-3-815 which
also explains the provisions of UCA 75-3-803 states:
Under 75-3-803(1)(a), if a local (property only) administration is commenced and
proceeds to advertisment for claims before
nonclaim statutes have run at domicile,
claimants may prove claims in the local
administration at any time before the local
nonclaim expires. This section has the
effect of subjecting all assets of the
decedent, wherever they may be located
and administered, to claims properly presented in any local administration. It is
necessary, however, that the personal representative of any portion of the estate be
aware of other administrations in orsier for
him to become responsible for claims and
charges established against other administrations." (Emphasis added)
From the above it is clear that the personal
representative of an estate in the domicile cannot be
bound merely by the filing of the claim in another state.
Thus, unless the claim is properly established after Advertisment for claims or publication of notice in the second
forum prior to expiration of the nonclaim period in the
domicile, it has no validity in the domicile. And, since
there had been no publication in the State of Nevada or any
state when Appellant filed its claim in Nevada, said claim
could not constitute an established claim.
In its brief Appellant cites three cases which appear
to support the proposition that a creditor's claim may be filed
prior to the publication of notice to creditors.

A careful

review of these cases, however, raises substantial questions
about the validity of this proposition.

Appellant's mainly

posits its theory relying on Re Estate of Tanner, 288 So. 2d
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587, 70 A.L.R. 3d 778 (Fla. App. 1974).

In Tanner, a curator

had published notice to creditors absent court authorization.
A certain creditor responded by filing a claim.

Thereafter,

and within the time provided by Florida Statute, the estate
filed an objection to the claim.

The creditor, however, failed

to timely file suit after the rejection of its claim by the
estate and the trial court held that the statute of limitations
barred the action.

On these facts the trial court certified,

inter alia, the following question on appeal.
"4. [where] a curator, appointed on February
18, 1971, and to whom letters of Curatorship
were issued on February 26, 1971, published
notice to creditors without order of court
authorizing him to do so, the first publication of which notice was made on March
6, 1971, and claimant filed claim on August
29, 1971, and heirs at law of decedent and
their Attorney filed objection to such claim
on October 12, 1981, and duly served such
objection on the claimant, is claimant barred, by failure to file suit, to establish
claim within the time limited by FS Section
33.18, FSA?" (70 A.L.R. 3d 780.)
In attempting to formulate an analytical framework
to answer this question, the Appellate Court asked the following
question:

"Could a claim have been filed and could a valid

objection to the claim have been filed by the heirs even though
no legal notice to creditors had been published?1' (IdL at 783.)
The question posited and its answer were clearly dicta and
clearly unnecessary to resolve the dispute.

Also, in Tanner,

notice had been published by the curator prior to filing of
the creditors claim, however, this notice had been erroneously
published without an appropriate court order as required by
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Florida Law.

Further distinguishing the Tanner case, that

Court emphasized the differences under Florida Law between
the authority of a curator and a personal representative.
The authority of curators and personal representative was
found not to be the same, therefore, the pronouncements of the
Tanner case governing Florida curators are not persuasive in
this case dealing with a personal representative and are dicta.
Appellant than cites the old cases of Davis v. Davis1
Estate, 56 Mont. 500, 185 P. 559 (1919), and Lowry v. Crandall,
52 Ariz. 501, 83 P.2d 1003 (1938).

Both Davis and Lowry were

decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.

In

Davis, the Montana Supreme Court decided a case in which the
general statute of limitations had run prior to the expiration
of three months from publication of Notice to Creditors.

The

Creditor's claim in that case was filed after publication to
creditors. The appellant argued that the general statute of
limitations should be extended three months from publication
to creditors on the theory that he could not file a claim
until after the publication of Notice to Creditors.

The Davis

court held that a statute of limitations having commenced to
run against a claim during the lifetime of the maker is
interrupted only from the date of death to the appointment
of an administrator.

The court rejected the appellant's

theory that he could not file a claim prior to publication.
However, this view is once again dicta because the Court's
holding rested on another basis.

Furthermore, in Davis,

publication of notice to creditors was completed prior to the
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filing of the creditor's claim.

Thus Davis is both unique and

inapposite to the instant case.
Lowry v. Crandall, supra, is more closely on point
wherein an Arizona court held that it was proper to file a claim
before publication of notice to creditors. Decided under pre
code law, patterned after an earlier California statute, it
is likely that the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code were
aware of both the Lowry decision and the California statute.
Thus, their inclusion of the words "and proceeds to advertisement" in their comments to Sections 803 and 815 were most
likely intended to settle the issue raised by such cases as
the Lowry case and to reject the rules stated therein.

The

Personal Representative is unaware of any authority which has
squarely decided this issue since the enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code in the various states.
The Personal Representative believes that this
court should hold that Appellant's claim was prematurely
filed and is void since no notice to creditors had been
published.

This holding rests upon sound policy reasons.

As previously noted herein the Uniform Probate Code is designed
to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims
against duly appointed personal representatives.

The Code

is structured to allow creditors to seek the appointment of a
personal representative, replace a personal representative
who is dilatory in his duties and to force the estate to
publish notice to creditors and otherwise administer the
estate to the benefit of all creditors. The Personal
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Representative believes that it is good policy to require
creditors who are anxious to file their claims, to apply
appropriate pressure on the estate to publish notice to
creditors.

This will have a salutory effect on Estate

administration to the benefit of other creditors who may not
be aware of the death or administration. Indeed if some
creditors aware of decedent's death are allowed to file their
claims prior to publication, then appropriate pressure may
not be brought upon the personal representative to perform
its statutory duty to publish Notice to Creditors. Thus,
requiring all creditors to file their claims after publication
of Notice to Creditors and at the same time giving said
creditors a tool to be able to force said publication is
sound public policy which protects and treats all creditors
of the estate equally, not just those who may be aware of the
death.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO ADJUDICATION IN THE NEVADA
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE WHICH WOULD
INVOKE THE OPERATION OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 75-4-401.
Utah Code Annotated 75-4-401 states as follows :
An adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor of or against any personal
representative of the estate is as binding on
the local personal representative as if he
were a party to the adjudication.
The word "adjudication" is not defined in the
statutory scheme.

Its definition, however, is probative in

determining whether there was an adjudication in the Nevada
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Administration binding on the Utah Personal Representative
with regard to Appellant's claim-

The Utah Supreme Court

in Nielsen v. Utah National Bank, 120 P. 211, 40 Utah 95
(1911), stated that the word "adjudication" means "a solemn
or deliberate determination by judicial power of the rights
of parties and so implies notice and a hearing". (120 P at
214.) An adjudication also implies that the claims or the
parties have been fully considered and put at rest by the
entry of a judgment.

People Ex. Rel. Argus Company v. Hugo,

168 N.Y.S. 25, 27, 101 Misc. Rep. 481 (1917); Miller v. Scobie,
11 So. 2d. 892, 894, 152 Fla. 328 (1943).
Other Courts have held similarly that the allowance
of a claim in a probate is an adjudication.

In Tiernan*s

Estate, 4, N.W. 2d 869, 871, 232 Iowa 139 (1942); Soppe v.Soppe,
8 N.W. 2d 243, 245, 232 Iowa 1293 (1943).

Ordinarily, however,

mere findings in an order upon which a court bases no decision
of the issues and which are not confirmed by the judgment do
not constitute an adjudication. See Fairchilds v. Ninnescah
Oil &' Gas Co., 99 P.2d 839, 843, 151 Kan. 551 (1940); Bird
v. General Discount Corp., 21 S.E. 2d 651, 653, 194 Ga. 283
(1942); Spalding v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. 117 A. 376,
378, 96 Vt. 67 (1922).

The order "settling the Final Account

of Special Administrator" entered in the Eighth Judicial
District Court for Clark County, Nevada, on May 11, 1984,
recites as a finding of fact that:
one creditor's claim was filed against the
estate by Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital,
in the amount of $24,832.54. Said creditors
claim remains unpaid at the date of the filing
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of said accounting since there are no assets
in the estate to pay said hospital- (R 87.)
The Order of the Court which follows this finding
of fact approves the accounting of the special administrator
and discharges the administrator. (R 88.) There is no indication in the order that the court had adjudicated the
allowance or disallowance of the creditor's claim.

This of

course would have been improper since the special administrator
had not been granted any authority to allow or disallow
creditor's claims.

The Court in Grigg v. Hanna, 278 N.W. 125,

130, 283 Mich. 443 (1938) held that findings of fact found in
an Order approving the accounting of an administrator did not
constitute an adjudication of the substance of the finding.
Simply stated, the issue of allowance of the claim was not
before the Nevada Court.

As further evidence of this fact,

it should be noted that when Appellant finally filed its claim
with the Personal Representative, the Personal Representative
vehemently opposed allowance of the claim and filed a counterclaim against Appellant alleging damages arising from Appellant's negligent entrustment of the decedent's personal property
to one Vonda Beisen. (R 19-22).

Had the Personal Representative

been aware that a claim of said hospital was being adjudicated
in Nevada, said counterclaim would have been immediately
instituted there•

While the Personal Representative admits

that the Order Settling Final Account of Special Administrator
in Nevada is an adjudication, the only issues adjudicated
therein are the acceptance of an acounting and the discharge
of a special administrator-

The mere recitation therein of
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the undisputed fact that a claim had been filed and was unpaid
is not an adjudication on the issue of the allowance or disallowance of said claim.
POINT V
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE NONCLAIM
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-3-803 TO WHICH
THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE NO EXCEPTIONS.
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-803 states:
(1) all claims against the Decedentfs
Estate which arose before the death of the
decedent, including claims of the state and
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by
other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the
decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the
date of first publication of Notice to
Creditors, if notice is given in compliance
with Section 75-3-801; provided, claims
barred by the nonclaim statute at the
decedents domicile before the first publication of claims in this state are also
barred in this State.
The parties stipulated and the trial court found,
that notice to creditors was properly published on the 30th
day of January, and the 6th and 13th days of February, 1983.
(R 111). Thereafter, Appellant filed its claim with the
Washington County Clerk on the 14th day of November, 1983.
(R 111). On these facts the district court concluded that
Appellant's claim was not timely filed and thus barred by
operation of Utah Code Annotated 75-3-803(a).

(R 112).
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Appellant now asks this Court to carve out an
exception to the strict application of the nonclaim provision
under the particular facts of this case. (AB at 15.)

Initially

Respondent vehemently objects to Appellant's characterization
of the facts recited in its brief allegedly justifying the
proposed departure from the statutory scheme. Neither the
Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court, nor the record
on appeal will support the Appellant's gratuitous allegations
that the decedent and the Personal Representative are guilty
of "fraud", "concealment", or "making false statements".
(AB at 15-16.)

For example, Appellant alleges that the

decedent made "false statements" with regard to his residence
and domicile.

This supposed false statement was allegedly

relied upon by Appellant preventing it from learning of the
decedent's true residence and domicile.

The Trial Court found

that the decedent listed his address with Appellant as 4001
East Sahara Avenue, the address of Maycliff Mini Storage and
RV Park, where property was stored by Kenneth Carl Larsen* (R
110.) The Trial Court made no finding and heard no evidence
proffered by Appellant that the decedent's listing of this
address was incorrect or intended to defraud or deceive
Appellant or was anything other than a misunderstanding or
mistake on the part of the decedent.

Further the Trial Court

made no findings and heard no evidence that Appellant relied
on this information to its detriment or was prevented thereby
from learning of the location of domicile or assets.
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Furthermore, a close examination of the Record On
Appeal reveals error in Appellant's assertion that this mistaken
or "false statement" by the decedent prejudiced the Hospital in
some way. On the 18th day of January, 1983, an administration
of the estate was opened in the State of Montana by filing a
Petition of Intestacy, determination of heirs and appointment
of personal representative.

(Finding No. 7, R 111.) The

Personal Representative appeared in the Montana matter
alleging decedent's domicile to be in Utah.
On January 27, 1983, Vonda Jean Biesen filed her
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Appointment of Administrator
with the Nevada Court.

In her attached points and authorities

Mrs. Biesen attached a Montana Driver's License and other
documentation in support of her position that the decedent
was a domiciliary of the State of Montana. (R 56-59.) Vonda
Biesen, thereafter, filed an Affidavit in the Nevada District
Court in which she alleged that the decedent's primary
residence was Butte, Montana, but admitted that "at the time
of his death we were spending some time in Las Vegas". (R
71.) If Biesen's allegations can be taken at face value the
Decedent had been spending time in Nevada just prior to his
death.

Thus, without more it is too harsh a judgment to allege

fraud or false statement based on the simple listing of an
address on an admission form.

The Decedent was not a lawyer

and could not be expected to know that Appellant was inquiring
about his legal residence or domicile if indeed this is the
intent of the inquiry.
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The allegation that the decedent intentionally
gave a false address, even if true, could not of itself
prejudice Appellant.

Appellant apparently assumes that since

Nevada was the place of decedent's residence Nevada was also
the State of domicile and the only state in which a probate
would be opened.

The allegation that the decedent incorrectly

identified his address in Las Vegas cannot reasonably be
twisted, however, into an affirmative representation that
Nevada was the State of domicile or the only proper place of
the probate of the estate. Appellant has access through the
filings with the Nevada Court to information regarding the
name and address of the personal representative, and facts
regarding the Montana probate and indirectly the Utah administration.

Appellant simply incorrectly assumed that Nevada was

the only place of administration and on appeal now desires to
place the consequence of that assumption on the estate.
Appellant entices this Court in its brief to fashion
a new equitable exception to the strict operation of the nonclaim statute on the alleged facts cited in its brief.

The

Personal Representative believes that creating such an
exception would have a disastrous effect on the integrity
of the Uniform Probate Code and is unsound as a matter of
public policy.

The policy reasons for establishing statutes

of limitations and specifically the relatively short nonclaim
provisions of the Probate Code are well known and need not be
documented herein. (See e.g., 51 Am Jur 2d "Limitation of
Actions" §17.) The creation of an equitable exception to the
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operation of the nonclaim statute sends a signal to every
claimant whose claim had been barred, that it should bring
an action to establish an equitable exception.

This could

have the effect of opening the floodgates of litigation within
estate administrations and thus delay and prolong the administration and closing of estates all to the prejudice and detriment
of both heirs and creditors.

The Personal Representative also

believes that, except in extreme cases, the creation of an
exception to the operation of the nonclaim statute should be
primarily as legistative prerogative.
Appellant cites Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84
(Utah 1981), in support of its proposition that the unique
facts of this case justify an exception to the nonclaim
statute-

In Myers, appellants posited two arguments why

their cause of action should not be barred by a two year
statute of limitations.

They argued (1) that the cause of

action should not accrue until the Plaintiffs discovered the
death - the so called "Discovery Rule" or (2) that the
Defendant should be precluded from relying on the statute
because [Defendant] erroneously reported the decedent's name
which misled the Plaintiffs and prevented them from instituting
their action in a timely fashion.
The facts in the instant case would not support
the creation of an equitable exception on either basis
stated in the Myers case.

In the instant case, Appellant

cannot argue the application of the "Discovery Rule".

Clearly

the Hospital knew that it had a claim against the decedent's
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estate and in fact had filed a claim in Nevada on the sixth
day of January, 1983-

Appellant further cannot successfully

argue that it was misled or prevented by the decedent or the
Personal Representative from filing a claim or otherwise
protecting its interest.

As previously explained herein, the

statement of the decedent identifying an address in Las Vegas
as his address caused Appellant to file its claim in the state
of Nevada which was not prejudicial to Appellant.

By reviewing

the Nevada Court file, Appellant could have discovered other
administrations.

Appellant's new argument that the Personal

Representative concealed the administration of the estate in
Utah is simply without merit.

No findings by the trial court

or any facts were proffered by Appellant in support of this
claim.

While it is true that as Personal Representative of

the estate in Utah, Vickie Carroll did not notify Appellant of
Publication in Utah, there is no evidence that the personal
representative had actual knowledge of Appellant's claim and
there is no affirmative duty on a personal representative to
notify claimants in ancillary administrations.

Consequently,

Respondent urges that there are no unique and compelling facts
found in the record of this case that would justify circumvention of the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform Probate Code
by establishment of an exception.
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s
POINT VI
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-1-106 HAS NO APPLICATION
IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Utah Code Annotated 75-1-106 states:
Wherever a fraud has been perpetrated
in connection with any proceeding or any
statement filed under this code or if fraud
is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions
or purposes of this code, any person injured
thereby, may obtain appropriate relief against
the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from
any person (other then a bona fide purchaser)
benefiting from the fraud, whether innocent
or not. Any proceeding must commence within three years after the discovery of the
fraud, but no proceeding may be brought
against one, not a perpetrator of the fraud
later then five years after the commission
of the fraud. This section has no bearing
on remedies relating to fraud practiced on
a decedent during his lifetime which effects
the succession of his estate.
Appellant urges that it should be given relief from
the three month limitation of Section 75-3-803 and should be
allowed three years to bring its claim pursuant to UCA
75-1-106, because of the supposed fraud of the decedent in
giving misinformation regarding his residence.

Initially,

it should be reasserted that the allegations of fraud are
naked allegations unsupported by the findings of the Trial
Court or the Record on Appeal. However, even assuming
arguendo the truth of the allegations raised in Appellant's
brief, the Personal Representative believes that UCA 75-1-106
has no application in this case. The language of UCA 75-1-106
limits its application to frauds perpetrated "in connection
with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this code,
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or if used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes
of this code". The supposed fraud in the instant case was
the decedent's failure to provide the Petitioner with the
proper residential address on an admission form.

Clearly

this alleged pre-death failure on the part of the decedent
was not perpetrated "in connection with any probate proceedings"
or in connection with "filing any statement" in his own
probate proceeding.

Thus, Appellant must prove that Decedent

intended to "avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes
of the code". Appellant has cited no finding or other
evidence which would substantiate the claim that the decedent
listed his address as 4001 East Sahara Avenue with the
intent of circumventing the provisions or purposes of the
Uniform Probate Code, nor is there any evidence that in fact
the decedent's stated address had this effect.

As stated

previously on February 11, 1983, Vonda Biesen made a Motion
to Dismiss the Petition of Mr. Shaffer for appointment as
administrator in Nevada.

(R 56.) In her Motion and Supporting

Affidavit Mrs. Biesen alleged that the Decedent was a resident
of the State of Montana.

Mrs. Biesen produced as Exhibits

to her motion, a Montana Driver's License, and several
Montana Vehicle Registrations.

Thus, Appellant was put on

notice that the decedent may not be a Nevada domiciliary.
Additionally, had Appellant simply inquired, a probate had
been already initiated in the State of Montana.
No. 7, R 111.)

(Finding

In that Administration Vickie Carroll the

personal representative in the Utah Administration had
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alleged both that the decedent had assets in and was a
domiciliary of the State of Utah and not Montana or Nevada.
Thus, Appellant, with due diligence could have and should
have discovered the facts regarding the decedent's domicile
and the location of his assets.

Clearly if the Personal

Representative had been attempting to conceal assets the
list of assets found in the Nevada Court file and the allegations in the Montana Administration would not have been
made.

Simply stated there is no evidence of fraud in the

probate, and the Personal Representative's actions bely any
such assertions, belated or otherwise.
POINT VII
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-12-38 HAS NO APPLICATION
IN THE INSTANT CASE
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-38 states:
If a person against whom a cause of
action exists, dies without the state, the
time which elapses between his death and the
expiration of one year after the issuing,
within this state, of letters testamentary
or letters of administration in not a part
of the time limited for the commencement of
an action, therefore, against his executor
or administrator*
The purpose of UCA 78-12-38 is to extend the time
for commencement of actions imposed by other general statutes
of limitations under stated circumstances. It operates in
conjunction with regular statutes of limitation to alter
their effect.
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Appellant argues that UCA 78-12-38 should extend
the time for filing its claim in the instant case, to the
exclusion of the operation of UCA 75-3-803. Appellantfs
agrument is invalid.

The Uniform Probate Code, enacted in

1975 many years after the adoption of UCA 78-12-38 in 1951,
recognizes the continued existence and operation of a multiplicity of statutes of limitation. The Uniform Probate Code
provides the groundrules for determining which of many potentially conflicting statutes of limitations will control. UCA
75-3-802 states:
The running of any statute of limitations
measured from some other event than the death
and advertisment for claims against the
decedent is suspended during the three months
following the decedent's death but resumes
thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant
to the Sections which follow. For purposes
of any statute of limitations, the proper
presentation of a claim under Section
75-3-804 is equivalent to commencement of
a proceeding on the claim.
Thus, every regular statute of limitation is extended or
suspended for three months following the decedent's death
but resumes its operation and may bar a claim after the
three month suspension.
An Editorial Board Comment to UCA 75-3-802 states:
It should be noted that under UCA Section
75-3-803 and Section 75-3-804, it is possible
for a claim to be barred by the process of
claim, disallowance, and failure by the
creditor to commence a proceeding to enforce
his claim prior to the end of the three
month suspension period. Thus, the regular
statute of limitations applicable during
the debtor's lifetime, the nonclaim
provisions of Section 75-3-803 and Section
75-3-804, and the three year statute of
limitation of Section 75-3-803 all have
potential application to the claim. The
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first of the three to accomplish a bar
controls, (emphasis added)
The clear intention of the framers of the Probate
Code is that whichever of the applicable statutes of limitation
first accomplishes a bar will control the other potentially
applicable statutes of limiation to their exclusion.

In

this case UCA 75-3-803 accomplishes a bar before UCA 78-12-38,
therefore, the three month nonclaim provision of Section
75-3-803 controls.
Appellant correctly states the rule of law that
statutes should be construed together, harmonized and each
given a sphere of operation if possible. (AB at 20.) Even
though UCA 78-12-38 does not apply in the instant case because
UCA 75-3-803(a) was first to accomplish a bar, this does not
mean that UCA 78-12-38 has no sphere application or has been
repealed by implication.

Thus, there are some circumstances

under which UCA 78-12-38 may still have a sphere of operation
which may be harmonized with UCA 75-3-803. Suppose hypothetically,
that a person against whom a cause of action existed died
outside of the State of Utah, thus triggering the possible
application of UCA 78-12-38 by its own terms. Hypothetically,
the regular statute of limitations would bar action on the
claim within five months after the decedent's death.

Four

months after the decedent's death letters of administration
are issued, however, there is no publication of Notice to
Creditors.

In this hypothetical UCA 75-3-803(a) would have

no application since no notice to creditors had been published.
Additionally, Section 75-3-803(b) would not operate until
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three years after the decedent's death.

Section 78-12-38

would operate to extend the bar provisions of the regular
statute of limitations one year after the issuance of letters
of administration.

Since the regular statute of limitations

as extended by UCA 78-12-38 is still the first to accomplish
a bar, it would control.
The adoption by this Court of the proposition posited
by the Appellant to-wit, that Section 78-12-38 applies to the
exclusion of §75-3-803 in cases where the decedent dies
outside the state of Utah, would have the effect of repealing
by implication portions of §75-3-803 which expressly apply
to decedents who die out of state. UCA 75-3-803(a) states
that claims in this state are barred within three months
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors
provided that "claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the
decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims
in this state are also barred in this state."

The codifiers

intended that claims could be barred in this state if a
personal representative had been appointed in an alternative
forum who had published notice to creditors and claims had
been barred in the alternative forum by that state's nonclaim
statute.

This provision would be repealed by Appellant's

proposition.
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-803(b) provides that a
claim is forever barred three years after the decedent's
death, even if no notice to creditors had been published.
Adoption of Appellant's proposition that §75-3-803 is supplanted by §78-12-38 could extend claims for a period in
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excess of three years if letters testamentary or letters of
administration were issued toward the end of the three year
period even though no notice to creditors had been published
within three years thus impliedly repeal UCA §75-3-803(b).
Additionally, if §75-3-803 is inoperable in a case where a
decedent dies out-of-state the limitation period could be
extended indefinitely by the operation of §78-12-38, since
neither the Uniform Probate Code nor UCA §78-12-38 affirmatively requires that letters of testamentary or letters of
administration be issued in the State of Utah.
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-105 provides that the
Probate Code is a general act intended as a unified coverage
of the subject and no part of it should be deemed impliedly
repealed if this can be avoided-

Since the provisions of UCA

§78-12-38 can be harmonized with the provisions of UCA
§75-3-803 on the basis that the operation of the first statute
of limitations to accomplish a bar will operate to the exclusion of other relevant statutes of limitation, there is
no justification for the creation of a category or class of
cases consisting of those cases in which a decedent dies
outside of the State of Utah upon which the provisions of
§75-3-803 does not operate and would be impliedly repealed.
Appellant's argument is untenable and cannot be adopted by
this Court without undermining and destoying the unity and
purposes of the Uniform Probate Code-
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CONCLUSION
The District Court's ruling that Appellant's Claim
is barred by the operation of the nonclaim provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code should be affirmed.

In the instant case,

Appellant filed a claim in an ancillary probate prior to the
appointment of a personal representative which claim was never
adjudicated in that forum, and thereafter failed to timely
file its claim with the duly appointed personal representative
in the local administration.

Appellant's arguments run counter

to strong public policy and misinterpret the harmonizing
effect of the Uniform Probate Code on the various applicable
statutes of limitation.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court's ruling that Appellant's Claim
is barred by the operation of the nonclaim provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code should be affirmed-

In the instant case,

Appellant filed a claim in an ancillary probate prior to the
appointment of a personal representative which claim was never
adjudicated in that forum, and thereafter failed to timely
file its claim with the duly appointed personal representative
in the local administration-

Appellant's arguments run counter

to strong public policy and misinterpret the harmonizing
effect of the Uniform Probate Code on the various applicable
statutes of limitation.
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